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Articles

I

Trafficking in Confiscated Cuban
Property: Lender Liability Under the
Helms-Burton Act and Customary
International Law
S. Kern Alexander*
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act ("HelmsBurton Act") 1 provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction and
sanctions against foreign companies which traffick in confiscated
U.S.-owned Cuban property. The Helms-Burton Act provides U.S.
nationals with a private right of action in U.S. courts against

foreign persons and companies which benefit from the use of
confiscated property.'

The Act also authorizes the exclusion from

U.S. territory of any corporate officers, directors, or controlling
shareholders, including their spouses and minor children, of
companies which derive any economic benefit from the use of

* A.B., Cornell University, 1986; M.Sc., Oxford, 1990; M.Phil., Cambridge
University, 1992; J.D., University of Minnesota, 1994. Attorney (Florida) and
Solicitor (England & Wales). The author is a Research Associate at the Institute
of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London, and advises a number of
European businesses on their liability under US economic sanctions.
1. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD), Pub. L. 104114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91 (1995)) [hereinafter "HelmsBurton Act"].
2. Section 302(a) of the Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 815 (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6082(a) (1996)).
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confiscated Cuban property.3 Moreover, section 103(a) of Title I
of the Act imposes civil liability and criminal sanctions against U.S.
lending institutions and U.S.-controlled foreign institutions which
knowingly make any loans to persons who traffick or benefit from
the use of confiscated Cuban property.4
Part I of this article will focus on the events which led to
passage of the Helms-Burton Act and on how some countries have
responded. Part II will analyze the civil liability provisions of Title
III of the Act, with particular emphasis on how they affect lending
institutions which finance transactions involving confiscated
property in Cuba. Part II will also discuss the potential penalties
and fines which the U.S. government may impose against U.S. or
U.S.-controlled banks which finance transactions in Cuba. Part III
will describe the alien exclusion provisions of Title IV and how
they are applied to officers and directors of non-U.S. companies
which traffick in confiscated Cuban property. Part V argues that
Titles III and IV of the Act violate certain principles of customary
international law.
I.

The Helms-Burton Act - Background

On March 12, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act ("The6
The Act, better known as the Helms-Burton law,
Act").5
purports to increase pressure on the Cuban government by
tightening the thirty-five year old U.S. trade embargo against Cuba.
Title III of the Act contains sweeping language which permits U.S.
nationals whose property was expropriated without compensation
by the Castro regime to sue in U.S. federal court foreigners who
traffick or benefit from the use of such confiscated property.7 Title
IV of the Act requires the revocation of travel visas issued by the
U.S. government to any foreign person who is the officer, director,
or controlling shareholder of a business entity which does business

3. Section 401(a), (Grounds for Exclusion), 110 Stat. 822 (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6091(a) (1996)). The revocation of visas under Title IV also applies to
the family members of the officials of companies which have benefitted from the
use of expropriated property. Id.
4. Id. § 6033(a).
5. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1.
6. The Helms-Burton Act was named after Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) and
Representative Dan Burton (R-IN) who were the primary sponsors of the Act in
the U.S. Congress.
7. Section 302(a), 110 Stat. 815 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082).
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affecting expropriated property in Cuba.8 These provisions have
already angered U.S. trading partners and have prompted some to
enact retaliatory measures against U.S. exporters.9
In addition, the Act codifies the existing trade embargo, which
has imposed sanctions through executive orders since 1962,10 and
increases direct and indirect economic sanctions against Cuba. The
four major provisions of the Act have the stated purposes of: (1)
increasing international sanctions against the present Cuban
government; (2) assisting Cuba in the transition to a democraticallyelected government; (3) protecting the property rights of United
States nationals who had Cuban property expropriated by the
Castro government after the 1959 revolution; and (4) excluding
from U.S. territory aliens who control the confiscated property of
U.S. nationals in Cuba or who traffic in such confiscated property.11 The latter two provisions of the Act are found respectively
in Title(s) III and IV and have been widely criticized by several
states as an illegal attempt by the United States to extend its law
extra-territorially in violation of customary international law and of
U.S. treaty obligations.
The Clinton Administration initially opposed a more moderate
version of the Helms-Burton bill primarily because it appeared to
violate international law and would likely prompt retaliation from
U.S. trading partners. 2
However, after two Cuban M.I.G.s

8. Section 401(a), supra note 3.
9. See Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo's assertion that Helms-Burton
violates the North American Free Trade Agreement. C. Gopinath, India:
Extraterritoriality;Not a Problem for the U.S., Bus. LINE, Aug. 8, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 11678398. The Organization of American States (OAS) voted 23 to
1 with 10 abstentions to pass a resolution condemning Helms-Burton as violative
of sovereignty. Id.
10. The Embargo on All Trade with Cuba was first imposed on Feb. 3, 1962,
by President Kennedy. Proclamation 3447, 3 Feb 1962, Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962). The
initial embargo and implementing regulations were issued pursuant to § 620(a) of
the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 620(a), 75 Stat. 444
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (presently (a)(1)). 22 U.S.C. § 6032(h), derives
its authority from 22 U.S.C. § 1631(e), International Claims Settlement Act of 1949
which authorizes the President to impose trade sanctions by executive order.
11. See generally, Section(s) 102, 103, 302 and 401 of the Helms-Burton Act,
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6022).
12. See Andreas Lowenfeld, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD), 90 AM. J. INTL' L. 419 n.3 (1996) (quoting letter
from Secretary of State Warren Christopher to House Speaker Newt Gingrich,
dated Sept. 20, 1995). Secretary of State Christopher wrote that "H.R. 927 [the
House version of the Helms-Burton law] would actually damage prospects for a
peaceful transition ....
[and] would jeopardize a number of key U.S. interests
around the globe." Id.
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intercepted and shot down two small civilian planes piloted by four
Cuban-American citizens" in the Florida straits in February 1996,
President Clinton, under political pressure, reversed his policy and

signed a more stringent version of the bill into law. 4 While the
law may be aimed at blocking new foreign investment in Cuba, it
has instead caused much concern amongst many U.S. trading
partners and
has prompted some of them to enact retaliatory
5
1

measures.

The civil liability provisions of Title III of the Act impose

money damages upon any person who trafficks in or derives any
benefit from the use of confiscated Cuban property.16 Title III
creates a private right of action against "persons" who "traffic" in
property that was once owned by U.S. nationals or entities but was
expropriated without compensation by the Cuban government after
the 1959 revolution. 7 The language in Title III is so broad and
sweeping that it would permit a U.S. national who has a claim for

confiscated Cuban property to bring a civil action against a U.S. or
foreign lending institution which directly or indirectly finances any

13. The two unarmed civilian aircraft were Cessna 337's operated by the
Florida-based Cuban-American organization "Brothers to the Rescue"; the
airplanes were shot out of the sky by missiles launched from MIG-23 and MIG-29
fighter planes belonging to the Cuban Air Force. Stanley Meisler, Cubans Gleeful,
U.S. Transcriptof Attack Shows, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1996, at 1.
14. See Thomas W. Lippman & Douglas Farah, Incident Prompts New Calls
for HarderAmerican Line, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1996, at Al.
15. See Gopinath, supra note 9.
16. Section 302(a), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 815 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a) (1996)). For the definition of "trafficking" see 22 U.S.C. § 6023
(13)(a)(1)(i)&(ii).
17. Section(s) 301,302, 303, (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6082, 6083, 6084, & 6085
(1996)). U.S. nationals include U.S. companies, individual U.S. citizens, and
political asylum refugees from Cuba who later became naturalized citizens of the
United States. In addition, Section 4(13) defines "traffic":
(A) A person traffics in confiscated property if that person knowingly and
intentionally
(i) Sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise
disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses,
obtains control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an
interest in confiscated property,
(ii) Engages in commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from
confiscated property, or
(iii) Causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as
described in clause(s) (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages
in trafficking (as described in clauses (i) or (ii)) through another person,
without the authorisation of any United States national who holds a
claim to the property.
Section 4(13), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 790 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6023
(13)(A)&(B) (1996)).
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transactions involving confiscated Cuban property.18 Moreover,
Title III explicitly rejects the Act of State Doctrine and empowers

U.S. courts to adjudicate the property claims arising from the
Cuban government's expropriations of property located within
Cuban territory which occurred after January 1, 1959.19
In addition, Title IV of the Act imposes broad immigration

clauses which exclude from U.S. territory aliens who have confiscated the Cuban property of U.S. nationals or have trafficked in or
derived economic benefit from such property.20 The provision is
broad in the sense that it defines excludable aliens to include not

only the individuals responsible for the property-taking but also
anyone who directed or supervised a confiscation or trafficked in

or benefitted from the use of confiscated property. This provision
thus applies to corporate officers and controlling shareholders of
companies that have been "involved" in the expropriation of, or
trafficking in, such property.2"

The primary purpose of the Helms-Burton law is to increase
pressure on third-country nationals to stop investing in Cuba and
to reduce or eliminate their holdings of expropriated Cuban

assets.22 By exposing third-country nationals to liability, the Act
essentially permits U.S. claimants to enforce their property rights
under international law by authorizing U.S. courts to adjudicate
their claims and award damages.
Although Helms-Burton has become U.S. law, the President
has the authority to suspend or waive the filing of private claims

under Title III for six month intervals if the President determines
that to do so is in the U.S. national interest.23 The Act requires

18. Section 103(a), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 790 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082 (a)(4)(A)). Section 103(a) prohibits any "U.S. national, permanent resident
alien, or U.S. agency" from knowingly extending any "loan, credit, or other
financing" to any person for the purpose of "financing transactions involving any
confiscated property the claim to which is owned by a U.S. national as of the date
of enactment of this Act. Id. See also 31 C.F.R. Part 515.208 (1997).
19. Section 302(a)(6), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 815 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a)(6)). Section 302(a)(6) provides that "no court of the United States shall
decline, based upon the act of state doctrine, to make a determination on the
merits in an action brought under paragraph (1)." Id.
20. Section 401(a), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 882 (codified at 22 U.S.C.

§ 6091(a) (1996)).
21.

Id.

22.

See 22 U.S.C. § 6022(1)-(6).

23. Presidential authority to suspend the private right of action under Title III
derives from sections 306(b) and 306(c)(1)(b) of Title III, which provides that:
the President may suspend the right to bring an action under this title
with respect to confiscated property for a period of not more than 6
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the President to make this determination every six months
beginning in July 1996.24 The first of these waivers went into
effect on July 16, 1996, when President Clinton suspended authorization for filing actions, presumably to avoid the immediate rash of
filings and consequent reaction from other countries. 5 President
Clinton has maintained the suspension of claims under Title III
to
since then and has stated that he will not permit private claims
26
be brought under Title III for the duration of his presidency.
The international reaction to Helms-Burton has been overwhelmingly negative. Most countries contend that the Act violates
international law. 27

Canada and Mexico both claim that the Act

violates U.S. obligations under North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA"), and both countries have taken domestic
legislative action to counter the Act. The Canadian Parliament
responded by amending existing blocking laws to make it illegal for
Canadian businesses, including Canadian subsidiaries of U.S.
In
companies, to comply with the provisions of the Act.2"
addition, the Canadian Parliament has enacted an amendment to
its Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act ("FEMA") to provide
Canadian companies a means to countersue in Canadian courts to
recover damages awarded by U.S. courts under Title III of the
Act.29 In early September 1996, Mexico's Senate unanimously
approved a Helms-Burton "antidote" law which fines Mexican
companies that allow themselves to be fined under Helms-Burton.3"

The Council of Ministers of the European Union ("E.U.") has
formally approved a Regulation which is intended to neutralize the

months if the President determines and reports in writing to the
appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days before suspension
takes effect and that such suspension is necessary to the national interests
of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.
22 U.S.C. § 6063(c)(1)(B).
24. Id. See also 22 U.S.C. § 6064(a).
25.

James Bennett, To ClearAir With Europe, U.S. Waives Some Sanctions,

N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1998, A6.
26. Id.
27. Gopinath, supra note 9.
28.

John Urguhart, Wal-Mart Puts Cuban Goods Back on Sale, WALL ST. J.,

Mar. 14, 1997, at A3.
29.

Id. See also Alan Toulin, Canadato Retaliate in Kind to Anti-Cuban Law,

FIN. POST, June 18, 1996, at 1. See discussion about the British Protection of
Trading Interests Act in Gabriel M. Wilner, InternationalReaction to the Cuban
Democracy Act, 8 FLA. J. INTL'L L. 401 (1993).

30. See Daniel Dombey, Mexican Antidote to Cuban Law, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 3,
1996, at 5.
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extra-territorial application of the Helms-Burton law in the
European Community and to block the application of any other
U.S. economic sanctions laws which apply to European businesses
that seek to do business with U.S.-targeted countries."
The
regulation authorizes nationals of European Community states to
file countersuits in European courts against plaintiffs who have
filed actions against them under Title III of the Act.32 Similarly,
it allows E.U. persons who are subjected to U.S. government
enforcement actions for breach of U.S. sanctions laws to file
countersuits in European courts against the U.S. government for
any damages or penalties imposed as a result of the U.S. action.33
Moreover, the regulation effectively blocks the recognition and
enforcement within the E.U. of any judgment by a court or tribunal
outside the Community which gives effect to the U.S. legislation.34
It also makes non-compliance with a judgment under the Act
obligatory and permits E.U. persons and companies to recover the
amounts obtained by U.S. nationals under the Title III of the
Act.35
In addition, Canada, Mexico and the European Union have
threatened to employ the dispute resolution mechanisms of
international trade agreements against the U.S. to determine
whether Helms-Burton violates U.S. treaty obligations.
For
example, Canada and Mexico have invoked the dispute resolution
procedures of Article 1105 of the NALFTA to determine whether
the sanctions of Title(s) III and IV treat Canadian and Mexican
investors in accordance with international law.36 In October 1996,
the E.U. commenced dispute resolution procedures in the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") by requesting formal bilateral
consultations with the United States for possible U.S. violations of

31. European Union: Council Regulation No. 2271/96, Protecting Against the
Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third
Country, Nov. 22, 1996, cited in 36 I.L.M. 125 (1997) [hereinafter E.U. Council
Regulation].
See generally Kern Alexander, Advising Foreign Businesses
Regarding Cuban Property Interests:European Regulation 2271/96, Proceedings of
the American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice, Fall
Meeting, Miami, FL., November 1997.
32. See E.U. Council Regulation, supra note 31, at art. 5.
33. Id. at art. 6.
34. Id. at art. 5.
35. Id. at art(s) 5 & 6.
36. Art. 1105 (1), North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug. 12,
1992, revised Sept. 6, 1992, US-Can-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan.
1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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WTO provisions regarding restrictions on international trade.37
Shortly thereafter, E.U. ministers warned the U.S. government that,
if it attempted to impose penalties or sanctions against E.U.
persons or companies for violating U.S. economic sanctions, it
would freeze U.S. assets in Europe and impose visa requirements
on U.S. executives and their families in mirror image to the HelmsBurton Act. In April 1997, the E.U. suspended its WTO action for
six months after it had reached agreement with the U.S. on a set of
"binding disciplines" for negotiating a settlement on the use of U.S.
economic sanctions against E.U. nationals for benefiting from the
use of confiscated Cuban property. By October 1997, the E.U. and
United States had failed to reach a settlement and referred the
matter for review by the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD"). After extensive negotiations, the
United States and E.U. announced an agreement at the OECD G8
Summit on May 18, 1998, in which, inter alia, President Clinton
agreed to press Congress for changes in both Title(s) III and IV
of Helms-Burton in return for the European Union's establishing
a system to discourage Europeans from investing in confiscated
Cuban property by denying them subsidies, risk insurance and
diplomatic advocacy.38 Moreover, the agreement provides that an
international registry be established to list the claims of those who
had property illegally expropriated so that governments may be put
on notice when their nationals seek assistance for investment
ventures in property that was illegally confiscated.3 9 The E.U.U.S. agreement will fail to accomplish its objectives, however, if

37. See EU to Seek WTO Consultationswith U.S. over Cuba, European Union
News, (Sept. 17, 1996) <http://www.bso.com.eu/news/press/pr29-96.htm>, (quoting
a May 3, 1996 letter from Ambassador Hugo Paemen, Head of the European
Commission's Washington Delegation, to U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich).
The WTO appointed a panel of judges on February 20, 1997, to hear the E.U.
complaint. Id.
38. James Bennett, To Clear Air With Europe, U.S. Waives Some Sanctions,
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at A6. Specifically, the United States agreed to request
Congress to amend Title III so that the President could indefinitely waive the
filing of lawsuits by U.S. nationals against those profiting from the use of
expropriated property. Id. Similarly, President Clinton undertook to request
Congress to amend Title IV to authorize the President to waive indefinitely the
revocation of travel visas by the State Department against foreign nationals who
profit from the use of expropriated property. Id. Under current law, the State
Department is required to investigate all foreign companies doing business in Cuba
and to make a list of all foreign nationals who are known to benefit from the use

of expropriated property with the ultimate aim of denying the right to travel in the
United States. See infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.

39.

Id.
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Congress is unwilling to make the requested changes in the HelmsBurton law.
II.

Trafficking in Expropriated Assets: Imposing Civil Liability

The Helms-Burton Law contains provisions that should be of
concern to U.S. lending institutions, non-U.S. companies and
foreign banks that engage in business transactions in Cuba. As
discussed, the Act, inter alia, authorizes a federal cause of action
against persons who "traffic" in, or benefit from the use of
confiscated U.S. property in Cuba and requires the exclusion from
entry into the United States of such persons, their agents, and the
members of their immediate family. If the person is a corporate
entity, its officers, principals, and controlling shareholders are
excludable, along with any family members.
A. Lender Liability
Lender liability is an elastic concept which can cover a range
of liabilities involving various transactions amongst many different
parties."n In the context of banking, lender liability may arise in
a variety of situations including the following: negligent lending
practices, failing to exercise reasonable care and skill, and liability
as a constructive trustee.4' Liability may also be imposed against
banks and other lending institutions as a result of legislation, in
particular economic sanctions legislation imposed against certain
targeted countries.
Most U.S. economic sanctions laws impose
civil and criminal liability against U.S. lending institutions for
financing transactions involving certain targeted countries and
specially designated nationals of targeted countries.43 The Cuban
Assets Control Regulations ("CACRs") were issued by the U.S.
Government on July 8, 1963, pursuant to the Trading with the
Enemy Act of 1917" in response to the deterioration of diplomat-

40.

See generally Parker Hood, Lender Liability Under English Law, in BANKS,

LIABILITY AND RISKS, 70-78 (Ross Cranston, ed., 1995).
41. Ross CRANSTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW 233-35 (1996).

42. See generally Cuban Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part
515 (1997); North Korean Foreign Assets Control Regulations 31 C.F.R. Part 500;
Libyan Sanctions Regulations 31 C.F.R. Part 550; Iraq Sanctions Regulations, 31
C.F.R. Part 575; Iran Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560.
43. MICHAEL MALLOY, U.S. TRADE AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 37-71
(1989). Malloy provides general discussions of U.S. statutes and regulations which
control financial transactions with targeted countries.
44. Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 US.C. App. §§ 1-44 (1996) [hereinafter "TWEA"].
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ic relations between the United States and Cuba.45 The Office of
Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") of the Department of Treasury
administers the CACRs, which impose civil and criminal penalties
against U.S. persons, companies, banks or U.S.-controlled foreign
entities which do business in Cuba.46 The civil and criminal
liability provisions of the CACRs are separate and cumulative to
any rights a private claimant may have under Helms-Burton to seek
damages against "any person" who has benefitted from the use of
expropriated property.
The broad and sweeping language of Title III of the HelmsBurton Act would impose civil liability and damages against "any
person" who "trafficks" in or benefits from the use of confiscated
Cuban property.4 7 The term "person" is defined as "any person
or entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state., 48 Accordingly, section 302(a)(1)(A) of Title III imposes
subject matter jurisdiction against any person (U.S. or foreign) who
traffics in or benefits from the use of confiscated Cuban property
on or after January 1, 1959. 49 Section 4(4) defines "confiscated"
to include:
the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by the
Cuban Government of ownership or control of the property, on

45.

See generally HUGH THOMAS, THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 243-49 (1977);

see also MICHAEL GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF

PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CUBA 71-75 (1976), and Kern Alexander and Jon Mills,
Resolving Property Claims in a Post-Socialist Cuba, 27 LAW & POL. & INT'L BUS.
137, 142-45 (1995).

46. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.320. This regulation states that a "Domestic bank" for
purposes of OFAC regulation is "any private bank or banker subject to
supervision and examination under the banking laws of the United States or of any
State, territory or district of the United States." Id.
47. See Section 103(a), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 794, (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6033 (a) (1996)). Section 103(a) prohibits any U.S. person or entity from
knowingly extending any "loan, credit, or other financing" to any person for the
purpose of financing "transactions involving any confiscated property the claim to
which is owned by a US national. Id. See also § 302(a)(1)(A), Helms-Burton Act,
110 Stat. 815 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (a)(1)(A) (1996)). Title III authorizes
a private action against "any person" who "traffics in property that was confiscated
by the Cuban government." Id. This civil liability is in addition to the civil and
criminal penalties which the U.S. government may impose against a U.S. person
or U.S.-controlled company that does business with a Cuban national, the Cuban
government, or any property that was confiscated by the Cuban government. See
infra discussion in text about Cuban Assets Control Regulations at 31 C.F.R.
§ 515.300 (1997).
48. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(11).
49. Section 302(a)(1)(A), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 815 (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A) (1996)).
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or after January 1, 1959 - (i) without the property having been
returned or adequate and effective compensation provided; or
(ii) without the claim to the property having been settled
pursuant to an international claims settlement agreement or
other mutually accepted settlement procedure. 0
Moreover, section 4(13) of the Act states that a person "traffics" in
confiscated property if "that person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or
otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, leases,
receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages, uses, or
otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property,
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking
(as described in clause (i) or (ii) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)
through another person,51
without the authorization of any United States national who holds
a claim to the property. The definition excludes residential
property unless it is subject to a claim certified by the FCSC or is
occupied by an official of the Cuban government or ruling party.
The Act also exempts from the definition of trafficking, inter alia,
the trading or holding of securities which are publicly traded or
held unless the activity is by or with a Cuban person or entity on
the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Specially Designated
Nationals List."
The Act, however, does impose liability on any person who
"engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting
from confiscated property" or "causes, directs, participates in, or
profits from, trafficking," which is broadly defined as benefitting
directly or indirectly from the use of confiscated property. This
broad definition would most probably include the extension of
credit, loans, or the financing of transactions involving confiscated
Cuban property. Therefore, a French bank which finances a
business transaction enabling two Europeans to invest in confiscated Cuban property would incur civil liability to a U.S. national who

50. Section 4(4), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 789 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6043
(a)).
51. 22 U.S.C. § 6045.
52. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(b) & (c) (1995).
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had a claim against the Cuban government
for confiscating its
53
property on or after January 1, 1959.
In addition, section 103(a) of Title I prohibits any "United
States national, a permanent resident alien, or a United States
agency" from knowingly extending any "loan, credit, or other
financing" to any person for the purpose of "financing transactions
involving any confiscated property the claim to which is owned by
a United States national as of the date of enactment of this
Act., 54 Moreover, section 103(c) makes any U.S. person or
agency which finances transactions involving confiscated Cuban
property subject to the civil and criminal penalties of the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations." The prohibitions against financing
transactions involving confiscated property under Title I and the
potential for civil liability and damages under Title III significantly
increased the risk and liability of financial institutions which either
directly or indirectly finance transactions in Cuba.56

The Act defines property in section 4(12) as "any property
(including patents, copyrights, trademarks, and any other form of

intellectual property), whether real, personal, or mixed, and any
present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest
therein, including any leasehold interest."57

A United States

national, according to Section 4(15), is "any United States citizen,"
or "any other legal entity which is organized under the laws of the

United States, or of any State, the District of Columbia, or any
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States, and
which has its principal place of business in the United States."5 8

53. As a preliminary issue, the French bank could contest whether the U.S.
court could exercise personal jurisdiction over it in such a proceeding, but this
argument would fail if the French bank had any type of presence in the United
States, such as a branch office, agency, or representative office. In determining the
issue of personal jurisdiction, the court may consider the type of presence the bank
has in U.S. territory and whether that presence is sufficiently related to its
overseas business transactions involving confiscated Cuban property. This article
does not focus on the issue of personal jurisdiction; it merely discusses the
potential for liability and damages that could be imposed against non-U.S. and
U.S. persons who do business in Cuba.
54. Section 103(a), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 794 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6033(a) (1996)).
55. Section 103(c), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 794 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6033(c) (1996)).
56. Id. Some of the terms involved in this definition are further defined in the
Act, but others are not.
57. Section 4 (15), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 791 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6048(a)(15)).
58. Id.
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The Act, however, does not define what constitutes a "claim"
or what it means to "own" such a claim. Because of this lack of
definition, lending institutions to which section(s) 103(a) and 302(a)
may apply will need to develop means for determining whether any
property in Cuba that might in the future be involved in one of
their lending transactions was subject, on the date of enactment of
the Act, to an expropriation claim by a U.S. national. If the
property at issue is included in one of the expropriation claims
certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission ("FCSC")
under the Cuban Claims Programme,59 the determination by the
lending institution is relatively straightforward. However, there are
potentially hundreds of thousands of individuals who were not U.S.
nationals when their properties were seized by the Cuban government and who therefore fail to qualify to have their claims certified
by the FCSC under the Cuban Claims Programme; the programme
only permits certification of claims to those persons who were U.S.
nationals at the time their properties were expropriated.' These
uncertified claimants have never had the opportunity to assert their
claims in a public forum and their identity is not generally known.
If those individuals are deemed to "own claims" to these properties
as of the date of enactment of the Act, then any property in Cuba
could be subject to an undisclosed expropriation claim by a U.S.
national. Thus, the potential liability for lending institutions which
finance transactions which are either directly or indirectly related
to the use of expropriated property is enormous.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control in the Department of
Treasury has issued notices to all U.S. and foreign banks with
offices in the United States that they may be subject to the civil
and criminal liability provisions of the Helms-Burton Act and the
CACRs, and that they are required to exercise extreme caution to
avoid knowingly handling or processing any loans or credits to
persons doing business with expropriated property in Cuba. The
effect of section 302(a)of Title III is to impose civil liability on any

59. See The Cuban Claims Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 1110 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 1643 et seq. (Supp. V 1994)). Pursuant to Title V of the International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949, Congress authorised the International Claims Commission
(ICC) to adjudicate and administer certain expropriation claims held by U.S. entities. 78 Stat. 1110-11, 22 U.S.C. § 1643b(b). The ICC was renamed in 1954,
becoming the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC). In 1964, Congress
authorized the FCSC to administer and adjudicate against the Cuban government
expropriation claims. 22 U.S.C. § 1643c(a).
60. 78 Stat. 1110-11, 22 U.S.C. § 1643b(b). See also Delissa Ridgeway, paper
submitted to Cuba in Transition (January 1995).
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bank or lending institution which "knowingly" provides financing
of any sort to any person who is using the loan or credit to do
business in a manner which affects expropriated property. The Act
defines "knowingly" as having "knowledge or having reason to
know.",61 The language of this provision is so broad that it will
impose liability on U.S. or foreign banks which make loans to any
person who directly or indirectly derives an economic benefit from
the use of expropriated properties. For example, if a Florida bank
makes a loan to a French tobacco wholesaler who then purchases
tobacco from an expropriated Cuban farm and then sells the
tobacco in China and uses the proceeds to payoff the loan, the
bank would qualify as trafficker and risk being sued by the former
landowners-a U.S. national-even though none of the tobacco was
sold in the United States. The bank would also risk being
subjected to an enforcement action by the OFAC which may result
in additional civil and criminal penalties.
Some foreign banks and U.S. financial institutions have already
been placed on notice by prospective claimants under Title III and
by the OFAC that they are deriving proceeds from loans to foreign
nationals whose business activities affect expropriated property in
Cuba. The officers, directors, and shareholders of U.S. financial
institutions and U.S.-controlled foreign institutions should therefore
be aware of the civil liability provisions of the Helms-Burton Act.
1. Enforcement of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.-Before Helms-Burton, the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act had
expanded the scope of the U.S. trade embargo of Cuba to include
not only U.S. companies and their overseas branches, but also all
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, which included all foreign
banks and finance companies in which U.S. lending institutions held
a controlling interest.6 2 OFAC defined control to be any majority
ownership interest by a U.S. person in a foreign entity; if there is
no majority owner, U.S. control is determined by whether a U.S.
person can exercise effective managerial or supervisory control over
the foreign entity." For example, OFAC would determine that
a U.K. bank was subject to the jurisdiction of the CACRs if one of
its shareholders or directors was a U.S. national who had the
authority to exercise managerial control over the bank's lending

61. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023 (9) (1996).
62. See The Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1704(a), (b) (1992); 31 C.F.R.
Part 515.329 (1997).
63. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.329 (a)-(d) (1997).
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decisions. This enhanced extra-territorial jurisdiction of the
CACRs prohibits all U.S. institutions and U.S.-controlled foreign
banks from engaging in any trade or commercial activity, either
direct or indirect, with Cuba. 4 A U.S.-controlled bank which
violates the CACRs may be subject to civil and criminal penalties. 65 Moreover, the Helms-Burton Act codified the Cuban
Democracy Act and the CACRs, 6 thereby subjecting all banks
and lending institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction to potential civil
and criminal liability.67 Any bank or finance company which
violates these provisions is at risk for substantial monetary fines
Specifically, penalties for
and possible criminal prosecution.
violating the CACRs range up to ten years in prison, one million
dollars in corporate fines, and two hundred and fifty thousand
dollars in individual fines.6s
In addition, section 103(a) of Helms-Burton prohibits U.S.
lending institutions from "knowingly" extending credit for transactions involving expropriated property in Cuba to which a U.S.
national owns a claim.69 The requisite degree of knowledge is the
actual knowledge or the reason to know standard. This standard
is not specifically defined in the CACRs, but it is reasonable to
infer that actual knowledge could come directly from the claimant
or through official notice from U.S. government agencies. The
notice can also probably be imputed to the lender if, through the
exercise of reasonable diligence, it could have ascertained the
existence of an expropriation claim against the property. Similarly,
the CACRs prohibit any person or "banking institution" from
transferring credit or payments between banks or persons "with
respect to any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States" and that involves property in which the Cuban government
or one of its nationals has an interest.70
2. International Public Financial Institutions.-The Act
requires the Secretary of Treasury to instruct U.S. directors of
international financial institutions such as the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund and the Inter-American Development

64. See Title 31 Part 515 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1995).
See also OFAC, Foreign Assets Control
65. 31 C.F.R. Part 515.329.
Regulations For The FinancialCommunity, Nov. 4, 1997.
66. See 22 U.S.C. § 6032 (a)(1) & (2) (1996).
67. 31 C.F.R. Part 201. See also 22 U.S.C. § 6032 (a) (1)&(2).
68. OFAC, Foreign Asset Financial Regulations, Nov. 4, 1997.
69. 22 U.S.C. § 6032(a) (1996); see 31 C.F.R. § 515.208 (1997).
70. 31 C.F.R. Part 515.201 (a)(1) (1997).
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Bank to "use the voice and vote of the United States" to oppose
the admission of Cuba in these institutions.7 ' Further, the Act
provides that if any financial institution approves a loan or other
assistance to the Cuban Government over the opposition of the
United States, the Secretary of the Treasury shall be required to
withhold from such institution payment of a corresponding amount
of increase in the capital stock contribution by the United States to
that institution.72
In addition, the Act reiterates certain provisions of the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992 which authorizes, but does not require, the
U.S. government to withhold assistance of any kind to any country
which provides assistance to Cuba.73

The Act broadens the

definition of assistance to include forgiveness of debt owed by
Cuba or acceptance of equity interest in Cuban government
property in exchange for cancellation of Cuban debt.7 4
B. Trafficking in Confiscated Cuban Property: Procedural
Issues

The Act defines "trafficker" as any alien (company or
individual) who benefits from the use of Cuban property confiscated after the 1959 Cuban revolution. 75 The definition of trafficking
in expropriated property includes ."the buying and selling" of
expropriated property and "engag[ing] in commercial activity using
or otherwise benefitting from confiscated property,, 76 This
sweeping provision would subject any foreign company to a lawsuit
in U.S. court if that company had direct or indirect business
dealings affecting expropriated, property in Cuba. For instance, if
a French company purchased sugar from a French wholesaler who,
in turn, had purchased the sugar from a Cuban plantation which
had been expropriated and the company processed the sugar into
a product which it sold for a profit, such a sale would constitute
commercial activity which benefits from expropriated property.
The French company, therefore, could be held liable for damages
71. Section 105, Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 795 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6021(B)(1)).
72. Section 104(b), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 795 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6021 (15)(A)&(B)).
73. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
74. Id.
75. Section 105, Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 795 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6023
(4)(B)(i)).
76. Helmes-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 815 § 302(a) (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a)).
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in U.S. court, even if it had purchased the sugar from a non-Cuban
and had made no sales of the sugar product into the United States.
1. Claimant Eligibility.-Title III of the Act establishes a
private right of action for any U.S. national to file a claim in U.S.
federal courts against any third-country national who "traffics" in
expropriated property. The Act defines U.S. national not only as
a person who was a U.S. citizen at the time their property was
expropriated, but also as a person who became a U.S. citizen after
the expropriation occurred.7 7 The Act divides the universe of
eligible U.S. nationals who are entitled to fie civil rights of action
into three categories. First, there are the individuals and entities
whose claims were certified by the FCSC under the Cuban Claims
programme. Second, there are the U.S. nationals who were not
eligible to file claims under the Cuban Claims programme. Third,
there are the individuals and entities who were eligible to file
claims under the Cuban Claims programme but failed to do so, or
who had filed claims but had them denied by the FCSC. Each will
be addressed separately below.
The following discussion assumes that there is property in
Cuba that is defined under Section 4(4) of the Act as "confiscated
property," and that the activities of the third-country national
would fall under the very broad definition of "trafficking" in such
property. Section 4(13) of the Act states that a person "traffics" in
confiscated property if "that person knowingly and intentionally"
sells, disposes, transfers, or engages in "commercial activity using
Section
or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property.7 8
302(a)(1)(A) of Title III imposes civil liability and damages against
by the
any person who "traffics in property which was confiscated
79
Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959."
As mentioned earlier, the number of eligible claimants includes
not only certified claimants under the FCSC programme, but also
any U.S. national "who acquires ownership of the claim before" the
date of enactment of the Act. Therefore, if a certified claimant has
assigned her ownership of a claim to a third party before the
enactment of the Act, the third party has the right to bring an

77. 22 U.S.C. § 6023 (15) (1996).
78. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)(i), (ii) & (iii) (1996).
79. Section 302(a)(1)(A), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 815 (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A) (1996)).
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action in place of the certified claimant. ° Moreover, nothing in
the Act prohibits a group of. non-U.S. nationals who have no
connection whatsoever to the United States but who have claims
for expropriated property in Cuba from forming a U.S. corporation
and assigning their claims to that corporation to be asserted in a
Title III action. In fact, some U.S. lawyers in Florida have formed
such a corporation on behalf of Spanish claimants who still hold
unresolved property claims against the Cuban government.8'
a. Certified Claimants.-The Act makes it very easy for a
certified claimant to sue and obtain a judgment against a thirdcountry national trafficking in confiscated property in Cuba. A
certified claimant has the right, under Section 302(a) of the Act, to
bring a civil action for damages in a United States federal court
against "any person" who, after the end of a three-month grace
period beginning on the effective date of Title III of the Act,82
"traffics in property that was confiscated by the Cuban government
on or after January 1, 1959" to which the plaintiff has a certified
claim.
There are several time periods, however, that constrain this
right of action. First, Title III was initially intended to become
effective on August 1, 1996.83 Second, the statute provides a
three-month waiting period after Title III becomes effective in
which no liability attaches to conduct that would otherwise be
considered "trafficking." Third, the President has authority to
suspend the effective date of Title III for discrete six-month periods
if the President "determines and reports in writing to the appropriate congressional committees at least fifteen days before such
effective date that the suspension is necessary to the national
interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to
democracy in Cuba."84 The President may keep the suspension in
effect for consecutive periods of six months, 85 or may reimpose
the suspension after Title III has become effective.8 6 The suspen80.

22 U.S.C. § 6040-41. The third party claimant must be a U.S. national.

Id.
81. See Kenneth Bachman et al., Anti-Cuba Sanctions May Violate NAFTA,
GATT, NAT'L L.J. C3, Mar. 11, 1996.
82. Section 4(13), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 790 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6023(13)(B)(i)).
83. Section 306(a), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 821 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a)).
84. Section 306 (b)(1) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6063(b)(1)).
85. 22 U.S.C. § 6063 (b)(2).
86. Id.
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sion of claims expires automatically at the end of each six month
period, unless the President renews the suspension not less than
fifteen days before the expiration of the previous period. During
any period in which the filing of claims is permitted under Title III,
the President may immediately reimpose the suspension as to
claims not yet filed and impose a stay as to claims which are
pending in court. 87 Moreover, at any time, the President may
rescind any suspension of the applicability of Title III by "reporting
to the appropriate committees that
to do so will expedite a
88
transition to democracy in Cuba.,
Beginning in July 1996, President Clinton utilized his authority
under Section 306 (b)(1) to suspend the right to file claims under
Title III against parties which are allegedly trafficking in expropriated property.89 The effect of the suspension was to impose a
''cooling off" period in which foreign nationals were given the
opportunity to limit their liability under the law by disposing of
expropriated assets so that negotiations could continue between the
United States and its trading partners over the best approach to
bring about political and economic reform in Cuba. An example
will illustrate the application of the law. If the President had
permitted Title III to go into effect on August 1, 1996, a certified
claimant would have been prohibited from bringing a claim until
November 1, 1996.
During this three-month grace period,
claimants have the option of giving notice to alleged traffickers that
they are subject to suit in U.S. court unless they cease dealing in
confiscated property. If the alleged trafficker continues dealing in
confiscated property on November 1, 1996-the expiration of the
three-moth grace period-a claim will accrue for statute of
limitations purposes against the defendant and an action may be
brought.
Therefore, if Title III had gone into effect on August 1, 1996,
a certified claimant was prohibited from bringing a civil action
against a foreign party before November 1, 1996, assuming the
foreign party was "trafficking" in confiscated Cuban property at
that time. However, President Clinton's suspension of claims under
Title III has had the effect of postponing the time at which claims
may be brought. This works to the disadvantage of a foreign party

87. Section 306 (c), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat 821 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6063(c)).
88. Id.
89. Jim Lobe, U.S. -Cuba: Clinton Delays Law Suit Provisionsin Helms-Burton,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, July 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10768206.
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who may be subject to suits by certified U.S. claimants because the
President can revoke the suspension period without notice, and
once the suspension period has expired or has been revoked there
is no three-month grace period for the foreign defendant to prepare
against any potential claims.
2. Damages.-UnderTitle III of the Act, persons who traffic
in expropriated property will be liable for money damages to any
U.S. national who holds a claim to such property. 90 The amount
of liability imposed is based on the value of the expropriated
property, not on the value of the property which the defendant
benefitted from or used.9 1 With respect to the defendant, this is
the most onerous section of Title III. For example, if a Mexican
company purchased ten thousand dollars of tobacco from a
confiscated Cuban farm which had been valued at one million
dollars, the company would be liable not for the value of the
tobacco sold into the United States but for. the value of the
confiscated farm-one million dollars. There is no connection
whatsoever between the amount of liability imposed and the
economic benefit derived from the trafficking activity. Moreover,
after being placed on notice that he is trafficking in confiscated
property, if the alleged trafficker refuses to settle with the claimant
and then is determined to be liable, the defendant's liability could
the expropriated property plus
reach three times the value of 92
attorney's fees, interest and costs.
Once a lawsuit has been filed under Title III, the certified
claimant can recover from the defendant up to three times the
greater of the amount certified to the claimant by the FCSC plus
interest, or the fair market value of the confiscated property.
Under the statute, the fair market value of the property can be
calculated as either the current value of the property, or the value
of the property when confiscated, plus interest. 93 The claimant
can also recover "court costs and attorneys fees." 94 In determining the value of expropriated property for purposes of recovery,
there will be a presumption in favour of the amount certified by
the FCSC; such a presumption can be rebutted by "clear and

90. Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 815 § 302 (a)(3) (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a)(3)).
91. Id.
92. Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 815 § 302 (a)(1) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)).
93. 22 U.S.C. § 306(c).
94. 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (a)(1).
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convincing evidence" that the fair market value is the appropriate
amount of liability.9 5
3. Claims' Limitations.-Title III requires that certified
claimants who file suits against third parties must be seeking the
return of expropriated property or compensation worth at least
$50,000. This minimum amount in controversy is calculated on the
principal value of the claim "exclusive of interest, costs, and
attorneys' fees."'96 This section, however, contains an inherent
inconsistency: on the one hand, it defines the $50,000 minimum
claim to be "exclusive of interest," but on the other it states that
"[i]n calculating $50,000 for purposes of the preceding sentence, the
applicable amount under subclause (I), (II), or (III) of subsection
(a)(1)(A)(i) may not be tripled as provided in subsection (a)(3)."
The latter sentence, referring as it does to the amount computed
under subclauses (I), (II), and (III), implies that interest is to be
included in the computation.
Another limitation on the ability of claimants to file suit is a
two-year statute of limitations. Under Title III, actions may not be
brought more than two years after the trafficking giving rise to the
action ceased. For the person who has been dealing in or benefitting from expropriated property, this is significant because when
they cease dealing in such property, a two-year period begins to run
beyond which no Title III lawsuit may be brought with respect to
that property. Furthermore, this statute of limitations period may
begin to run while the presidential suspension is in effect. The
suspension period becomes, therefore, a window of opportunity in
which the trafficker may not be sued for benefitting from confiscated property but has the opportunity to dispose of such property
and thereafter to eliminate her Title III liability after the two year
limitations period has expired.
Subject to these limitations, the Act imposes strict liability on
third parties deemed to be trafficking in confiscated properties in
Cuba.97 Assuming that federal jurisdiction can be asserted over
the third party defendant, the plaintiff needs to establish two
elements in order to prove liability: 1) that the defendant was
"trafficking" in the properties at issue after plaintiff's right of
action accrued under the statute, and 2) that the last act of
"trafficking" occurred two years or less before the initiation of the

95.
96.

22 U.S.C. § 6082 (a)(2).
22 U.S.C. § 6082(b).

97.

Id.
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action. With regard to damages, the plaintiff can recover costs,
attorneys' fees, and three times either the certified amount of the
claim or the fair market value of the property, if that can be
established.98
4. Parties Who Failed to Certify Their Claims.-The statute
explicitly limits the ability of two types of potential claimants to
bring civil suits under Title III: the first type is U.S. nationals who
were eligible to file a claim with the FCSC under the Cuban Claims
Programme but failed to do so, and the second is U.S. nationals
who filed a claim with the FCSC but had their claim denied. The
first type of claimant is barred altogether from bringing an action
under Title III. The second type of claimant is not precluded from
bringing a court action against a third country national, but the
court must accept the findings of the Commission on the claim as
conclusive in the action under this section.99 Presumably, this
second type of claimant can bring an action but would have to
submit additional evidence beyond that determined by the FCSC
to be insufficient to prove ownership of the property in question or
the amount of the loss sustained.
5. Newly-Identified Claimants.-The Act allows U.S.
nationals who were not eligible to file an expropriation claim with
the FCSC under the Cuban Claims Programme to bring an action
for damages against third-country nationals who are allegedly
"trafficking" in properties that were confiscated by the Cuban
Government. Such actions, however, would be subject to the
conditions and limitations discussed above for certified claimants,
plus other limitations.
First, the action may not be filed "before the end of the two100
year period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act.
This period would replace the three-month wait period applicable
to certified claimants, and would be independent of any suspensions
in the effective date of Title III imposed by the President. Thus,
if President Clinton had not suspended the right to sue, the earliest
date in which actions could have been brought by non-certified
U.S. nationals would have been March 12, 1998 (date of enactment). If the President had lifted the suspension before March 12,

98. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(5)(B).
99. Id.
100. Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 815 § 302 (a)(5)(C) (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a)(5)(C)).
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1998, these claimants would have had to wait until then to bring
their actions. If the presidential suspension had remained in effect
beyond March 12, 1998, these uncertified claimants could have filed
their claims immediately upon the suspension being lifted. For
example, if the President lifts the suspension on January 1, 1999,
any conduct constituting trafficking on that date will permit the
alleged trafficker to be sued immediately or, within a two-year
period thereafter, in U.S. court. The suspension, however, has
remained in effect since July 1996.
Second, in an action by a non-certified U.S. claimant, the
plaintiff would have to establish ownership of the property in
question and the amount of the claim. The Act allows the court to
appoint a master, "including the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission," to make determinations regarding the amount and
ownership of the claim.'
Third, a non-certified U.S. claimant is not entitled to recover
treble damages from a third country defendant unless, after the
three-month period following the effective date of the Act, the
claimant gives notice of his claim to the foreign national trafficking
in the property at issue.01 2 If the party so notified continues to
traffic thirty days after receiving the notice, then the U.S. claimant
can recover treble damages in an action against the foreign party.
Again, assuming for example that the effective date of the Act is
August 1, 1998, a non-certified U.S. claimant could give notice after
November 1, 1998 of its claim to the potential defendant; thirty
days after receiving such notice (i.e., as early as December 1, 1998)
the foreign party could become liable to the claimant for treble
damages, although, as noted above, a lawsuit could not be
instituted until March 1998-two years after enactment of the Act.
The possibility of recovering treble damages should be strong
incentive for a potential non-certified claimant to reveal himself
early in the process, but not before the end of the three-month
period after Title III becomes effective. The thirty-day period
would not begin to run if the claimant puts the defendant on notice
before the suspension period has ended. It is also important for
the non-certified claimant to put the defendant on notice because
such notice serves to satisfy the requirement that the foreign party

101. Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 819 § 303 (a)(2) (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6083(a)(2)). Such determinations would not constitute certifications for purposes
of the Cuban Claims Programme.
102. Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 815 § 302 (a)(3)(B) (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a)(3)(B)).
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engage in the activities constituting trafficking "knowingly and
intentionally., 113 In the absence of such disclosure, it would be
difficult for the plaintiff to establish that the foreign party had
knowledge of the existence of a claim.
III. Exclusion of Aliens
Although the implementation of Title III of the Act has been
suspended indefinitely by President Clinton, Title IV took effect on
April 1, 1996, authorizing the exclusion of aliens who participated
in the confiscation of Cuban property or who are trafficking in
confiscated property. For example, in July 1996, the State
Department sent letters to nine officials of the Canadian mining
concern the Sherritt Corporation warning that the officials' U.S.
travel visas would be revoked if they did not sever their ties with
When they failed to
the company within forty-five days.1"
comply with the order, the State Department revoked their
visas.1 05 Similarly, in August 1996, the State Department notified
six executives from the Mexican telephone company Domos that
they and their family members would be deemed undesirable aliens
within forty-five days unless Domos divested itself of assets which
were initially confiscated from U.S. nationals by the Cuban
government. 1°6 When these officials also failed to comply, their
visas were revoked as well. 107

The basis for these actions is found in Section 401(a) of Title
IV of the Act, which excludes from the U.S. aliens who have
confiscated or have benefitted from the use of confiscated property.
The immigration exclusions in Title IV are very broad indeed with
respect to the categories of people to which they apply, the timing
of sanctions, and the conduct that brings about the exclusion. The
conduct includes trafficking in confiscated property, "a claim to
which is owned by a United States national." Trafficking occurs,
for purposes of Title IV, if a person "knowingly and intentionally"
transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, or otherwise disposes of
confiscated property. The relevant language of section 401(a)
states:

103.
U.S.C.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Section 302 (a)(2)(B), Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 815 (codified at 22
§ 6082(a)(2)(B)).
See Assoc. Press Cable no. 1430.
Id.
U.P.I. Cable no. 1344.
Id.
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The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Attorney
General shall exclude from the United States, any alien who the
Secretary of State determines is a person who, after the date of
enactment of this Act - (1) has confiscated, or has directed or
overseen the confiscation of, property a claim to which is owned
by a United States national, or converts or has converted for
personal gain confiscated property, a claim to which is owned
by a United States national; (3) is a corporate officer, principal,
or shareholder with controlling interest of an entity which has
been involved in the confiscation of property or trafficking in
confiscated property, a claim to which is owned by a United
States national; or (4) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a
person excludable under paragraph (1), (2), or (3)."
A review of the definitions of statutory terms contained in the
federal regulations brings out quite vividly the sweeping effects of
the exclusion provisions. The term "agent" has been interpreted
by the State Department to mean a "person who acts on behalf of
a corporate officer, principal or shareholder with a controlling
interest to carry out or facilitate acts or policies that result in a
determination under Title IV of the Act."'10 9 This broad definition of "agent" would permit almost anyone in a subordinate or
advisory role to be excluded. This would include lawyers or other
professionals who are employed by a company which does business
affecting expropriated Cuban property; it would also apply to
attorneys or professionals who are outside advisers to such a
company.
1.

Definitions.-The term "confiscates" is defined as follows:

the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by the
Cuban Government of ownership or control of property -(i)
without the property having been returned or adequate and
effective compensation provided; or (ii).without the claim to the
property having been settled pursuant to an international claims
settlement agreement or other mutually accepted settlement
procedure; and (B) the repudiation by the Cuban government
of, the default by the Cuban Government on, or the failure of
the Cuban Government to pay -(i) a debt of any enterprise
which has been nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise taken
by the Cuban Government; (ii) a debt which is a charge on

108. Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 815 § 302 (a)(3)(B) (codified at, 22 U.S.C.
6091(a)).
109. 61 Fed Reg. 30,656.
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property nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise taken by the
Cuban Government; or (iii) a debt which was incurred by the
Cuban Government in satisfaction or settlement of a confiscated
property claim.110
In other words, confiscation means the nationalization of
property by the Cuban government under decrees that were mostly
passed shortly after the Castro regime came to power. For
example, under the agrarian reform law, individual ownership of
land was limited to a maximum of 995 acres and corporate
ownership was similarly restricted.
By newly created definition, a "corporate officer" is "the
president, chief executive officer, principal financial officer (or
controller), any vice president of the entity in charge of a principal
business unit, division or function (such as sales, administration or
finance), or any other officer or person who performs policy'
making functions for the entity."111
A similar definition emphasizing the policymaking authority applies to a "principal" where the
entity is a partnership. Clearly, Congress has awarded the State
Department with almost limitless discretion to exclude any person
with any degree of corporate authority over confiscated property.
"Traffics" means a person
knowingly and intentionally-(i)(I) transfers, distributes,
dispenses, brokers, or otherwise disposes of confiscated
property, (II) purchases, receives, obtains control of, or
otherwise acquires confiscated property, or (III) improves
(other than for routine maintenance), invests in (by contribution
of funds or anything of value, other than for routine maintenance), or begins after the date of the enactment of this Act to
manage, lease, possess, use, or hold an interest in confiscated
property, (ii) enters into a commercial arrangement using or
otherwise benefiting from confiscated property, or (iii) causes,
directs participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described
in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person, without the
authorization of any United States national who holds a claim
to the property.112

As the language indicates, any commercial or administrative contact
with confiscated property can be deemed "trafficking." Indeed,
such broad language penalizes the acts of foreign company officials

110.
111.
112.

61 Fed. Reg. at 30, 656 (citing Helms-Burton Act § 401 (b)(I)).
Id.
Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 823 U.S.C. § 401 (b)(2).
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who negotiate or conduct business which has a direct or indirect
effect on expropriated property in Cuba. The effect of Title IV is
unparalleled in the area of exclusion law. 113
2. Claims Review.-Title IV has directed the Office of Cuban
Affairs in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs at the Department
of State to collect information on whether property in Cuba owned
by a U.S. national has been "confiscated" or whether trafficking in
For purposes of
such "confiscated" property has occurred.
determining excludability, the State Department will examine the
claims to expropriated property so long as the claimants are U.S.
nationals. This broad blanket of protection extends not only to
claimants who were U.S. nationals at the time their property was
expropriated but also to claimants who were not U.S. citizens at the
time their property was taken. The U.S. government, therefore,
will be "protecting" the property rights of persons who may not
have been U.S. citizens at the time the confiscation of their
property occurred.
In determining whether expropriated property is subject to a
claim by a U.S. national, the State Department will also consult
sources (including but not limited to U.S. government agencies)
regarding the identity of principals, officers, and controlling
shareholders, and their agents, spouses, and minor children.114
Once the Department of State finds that "facts or circumstances
exist that would lead the department reasonably to conclude that a
person has engaged in confiscation or trafficking after March 12,
1996," then a determination of excludability under Title IV will be
made.115
3.

Prior Notification.-Before a final determination of

excludability can take effect, the guidelines provide the affected
party forty-five days after the receipt of a "notification letter" to
divest from a "trafficking" arrangement in order to avert the
exclusion or to provide evidence that he or she is not "trafficking"
in confiscated property. After the forty five day period, the
Department of State will then make its determination based upon
that the alien or
evidence that would lead it to reasonably conclude
116
trafficking.
in
engaged
company involved is

113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 823 § 401(b).
Id.
Id.
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At the discretion of the Department of State, diplomatic and
consular personnel of foreign governments, and representatives to
and officials of international organizations may be granted
exemptions from Title IV. In addition, a medical exemption is
available, as well as one for purposes of defending an action under
Title 111.117 Unlike Title III, Title IV contains no provision
permitting the President to waive its requirements in the national
interests. In addition, there is no provision in the Act which
authorizes removal of a bar against entry into the United States
once an individual has been deemed to be excluded.
4. Standardof Proof-The standard for a finding of excludability is the more relaxed legal standard of "reasonable conclusion." After an exclusion notice is received, a non-U.S. national
has forty-five days to contest the finding. Consequently, the
burden of rebuttal can be quite difficult for the alien. Conversely,
the burden of identifying "confiscated" property will be an onerous
one for the State Department. Given the hostility with which Cuba
has received the Helms-Burton Act, the Cuban government will
most certainly not allow access to its corporate and financial
records. Except for such rare and clear-cut cases as Sherritt and
Grupo Domos-the former occupied a nickel mine that was
expropriated from a New Orleans company while the latter used
property that once belonged to IT--much of the evidence
submitted to the State Department will necessarily be anecdotal.
The extent to which this anecdotal evidence will justify a finding of
excludability -remains to be seen.
In addition, for the immigration exclusion to take effect, a
foreign national would need to "knowingly and intentionally"
engage in the proscribed activities. It is difficult to see how a thirdcountry entity could "knowingly and intentionally" traffic if the
confiscated property at issue is subject to a claim by a non-certified
claimant whose identity and status has not been previously
revealed. Therefore, the risk of Section 401(a) exclusion to a thirdcountry national doing business in Cuba materializes only when the
existence of U.S. nationals with expropriation claims against the
property in question is revealed or if the property is covered by a
claim certified by the FCSC.n 8

117. Id.
118. What is clear, however, is that once antidote laws announced by the
European Union, Mexico, and Canada are implemented in retaliation for the
Helms-Burton Act, U.S. executives and their families will be as undesirable abroad
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Unlike Title III, Title IV went into effect on March 12, 1996.
The Department of State has used it selectively to exclude the
officers, directors and controlling shareholders of major multinational companies which have significant operations in Cuba.
Although the law has only been invoked on a few occasions, its
application against certain British, Mexican and Canadian companies has attracted great publicity. Some experts have argued that
this publicity has deterred some companies from making investments in Cuba and has caused other companies to begin liquidating
existing investments. Moreover, it appears that, because of
increased pressure from the U.S. Congress, the Department of
State will be increasing the scope of enforcement for Title IV in the
near future to include not only high proffle executives of multinational companies, but also anyone who travels in the United
States and conducts trade with Cuba.
IV. International Law Implications
This section contends that the Helms-Burton Act violates
certain principles of customary international law, including the act
of state doctrine as it is derived from the principle of sovereignty,
the continuity of claim principle, the rule against secondary
boycotts, and the principle of jurisdiction to prescribe.
A. Act of State Doctrine.
Under customary international law, a state has no right to
enact laws which have the effect of intervening with a foreign
state's expropriation of private property located within its territory." 9 This rule derives from the act of state doctrine, which has
been primarily developed in the case law of the United States.12 °
The act of state doctrine is premised on the concept of sovereignty,
which is a long-recognized principle of customary international law.
The concept of sovereignty is important for understanding the act
of state doctrine. Sovereignty is based on the legal equality of
as their counterparts are in the United States.
119. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), rev'd 243 F.
Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
120. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 480 (1993). It is important to note that the act of state doctrine is a
product of U.S. case law, and it can be argued that it should not have status as a
principle of customary international law. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 323 (4th ed. 1990). It also has been recognized by
the English House of Lords Buttes Gas & Oil Co. v. Hammer, [1982] A.C. 888,
936-38 (H.L.).
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states within the international system, and holds that a state has
full power to enact laws that govern its own internal affairs within
its own territorial jurisdiction, but may not enact laws that govern
the internal affairs of other recognized sovereign states.121 The
Act arguably violates Cuban sovereignty because it allows a U.S.
court to judge the legality of certain acts of the Cuban government
in confiscating property located within Cuban territory. Moreover,
the Act imposes sanctions against foreign nationals whose trading
activities with Cuba occur entirely in another country with no
connection whatsoever to the territory of the United States.
The United States Supreme Court applied the act of state
doctrine in 1964 when it held that customary international law
prohibits a state from reviewing the legality of official public acts
of foreign governments within their borders.122 Essentially, the
act of state doctrine prohibits a court in state A from sitting in
judgment of the public acts of the government of state B if the
effects of the public acts of state B occur solely in state B. The
seminal U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with the act of state
doctrine is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.23 In Sabbatino, the Cuban government had nationalized a Cuban company
which had sold sugar to a U.S. commodities broker, who, to secure
consent for the sugar shipment, entered into a new contract with
124
the Cuban government and its shipping agent, Banco Nacional.
The broker paid the original owner of the sugar instead of Banco
Nacional's agent, and Banco Nacional sued the broker for conversion. 12' The broker responded that because the expropriation of
the Cuban sugar corporation violated international law, Banco
Nacional had no property interest in the sugar.12 6 Banco Nacional then invoked the act of state doctrine to prevent a U.S. court
from reviewing the legality of its expropriation. 127 The federal
circuit court of appeals ruled for Sabbatino, but was reversed by
the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the "judicial branch will

121.

Id.

122.

RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

TRANSACTIONS 683-86 (1995) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964)).
123. Banco Nacional, 376 U.S. at 398.
124. Id. at 403-04.
125. Id. at 406.
126. Id.
127. Banco Nacional, 376 U.S. at 401-04. In Banco Nacional, the Cuban
government nationalized a Cuban company that sold sugar to an American
commodities broker. Id.
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not examine the validity of a taking of property within its territory
by a foreign sovereign government."'"
Congress responded to the Sabbatino decision by enacting the
Hickenlooper Amendment 29 to the Foreign Assistance Act. The
Hickenlooper Amendment states that the act of state doctrine does
not preclude judicial or legislative action when the property taking
violates international law. 3 ° Based on the Hickenlooper Amendment, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier position on the act of
state doctrine in the Sabbatino case by holding in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Farr3 ' that the act of state doctrine is not a valid
defense against the claim of a U.S. national when the expropriated
property in question is located within U.S. territory.13 2 Though
the doctrine has been modified through statutory changes and
judicial interpretation, it still applies when tangible property is
situated in the taking state at the time of the expropriation.'33
Opponents of Helms-Burton would argue that the act of state
doctrine would prevent a state from enacting laws which have the
effect of intervening with a foreign state's expropriation of private
property located within its territory. By applying this doctrine, the
U.S. government may be prevented from granting relief for
confiscation claims, since these confiscations were official acts of
the Cuban government. In light of the Hickenlooper Amendment
and the Farrcase, however, if the expropriated property is attached
within U.S. territory, the act of state doctrine would not be a valid
defense against those claimants who were U.S. nationals at the time
the confiscations occurred. In contrast, it would be a valid defense
against those who were Cuban nationals at the time of the
confiscations.
It is important, however, to point out the principal argument
opposing the application of the act of state doctrine as a defense
under customary international law to a foreign national's claim for
confiscated property. Some legal scholars have argued that the act

128. Id. at 428.
129. This was actually the Second Hickenlooper Amendment. The First
Hickenlooper Amendment was passed in 1961 as part of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, which prohibits the U.S. Government from providing assistance to
Cuba until Cuba provides full compensation to U.S. nationals whose property was
confiscated. 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (West 1990).
130. Id.
131. 243 F.Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
132. Id.
133. LOWENFELD, supra note 120, at 523.
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of state doctrine is contrary to the rule of law and should be
rejected as a principle of international law.134 Indeed, the eminent British scholar FA. Mann argued that international law does
not require that the act of state doctrine be applied because no
international tribunal, according to Mann, had ever adopted it.135
But Mann admitted that the doctrine had been accepted in AngloAmerican and Dutch judicial practice. 13 6 More important, the
courts of other leading legal systems have accepted the act of state
doctrine as a corollary of the principle of sovereignty and thus asi
a principle of international law.137
In addition, Congress further limited the effect of the act of
state doctrine by adopting Section 302(a)(6) of Title III of the Act
which specifically declares the act of state doctrine inapplicable to
actions brought under the Act.138 It states: 'No court of the
United States shall decline, based upon the act of state doctrine, to
make a determination on the merits' in an action based on a Cuban
confiscation. By adopting this provision, Congress has effectively
eliminated the act of state doctrine as a defense in a Helms-Burton
action. Whether it is within Congress' dominion to effectively
negate a judicially recognized doctrine is a matter of dispute.13 9
Though the Supreme Court in Farr limited the reach of the act of
state doctrine, 40 the court has continually reaffirmed the existence and vitality of the doctrine. Therefore, if a Title III action
reached the Supreme Court, the Court may narrowly construe Title
III's attempt to abolish the doctrine or the Court may overrule
Congress entirely and apply the doctrine, especially if fairness and

134. F.A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 385 (1973).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See A.M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co. (U.K.), [1921] 3 K.B. 532 (C.A.)
(U.K. government exercising judicial restraint in adjudicating challenges to
expropriations by foreign states relying on act of state doctrine); Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. Ltd. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co (Italy), [19551 Int'l L. Rep. 23 (Civil Ct. Rome, Sept.
13, 1954) (narrow construction of state's responsibility to alien investors); Soc.
Minera El Teniente, S. v. A.G. Norddeutsche Affinerie (German Fed. Rep.), 12
I.L.M. 251 (Hamburg, Landgericht (Jan.22, 1973). For a discussion of cases in
favor and opposed to the idea of the act of state doctrine as a principle of international law, see Reeves, The Act of State - Foreign Decisions cited in the Sabbatino

Case: Rebutal and Memorandum of Law, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 599,618-70 (1965).
138. 22 U.S.C. § 302(a)(6).
139. Id.
140. E.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (West 1990), The Second Hickenlooper Amendment
to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; see also, Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (creating a Supreme Court exception to the act of
state doctrine for commercial activities by foreign sovereigns).
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equity require such a result. In general, though, the Act calls into

question the continuing vitality of the act of state doctrine.
Assuming for the moment though that section 302(a)(6) is
invalid and the act of state doctrine applies, the Act violates the
doctrine by authorizing the U.S. government to allow claimants
who were Cuban citizens, or citizens of any other third country, at
the time of the expropriations, to bring claims for compensation in
U.S. courts. This would put the U.S. courts in the position of
international arbitrator. Absent consent of the Cuban government,
international law provides no authority for the U.S. government to
intervene in a dispute between the Cuban government and
claimants who were Cuban nationals, or third-country nationals, at
the time that their property was taken.
B. Continuity of Claim Principle

The Act may also violate the international legal principle of
"continuity of claim." This rule of customary international law
permits a state to assert a claim against a foreign state on behalf of
an injured party only when the claimant was a citizen of the
protecting state at the time the injury occurred and remained a
citizen until the claim was adjudicated.141 Thus a U.S. claimant
who seeks the diplomatic protection of the U.S. government to
assert a claim on its behalf for confiscated property must have been
a U.S. citizen or national from the time of the confiscation until the
time the claim is adjudicated.
Title III of the Act authorizes claimants who were Cuban
citizens or nationals at the time their property was confiscated to
bring claims if they are U.S. nationals at the time they file their
claim for damages.'42 Thus, a U.S. national who was not a citizen
or national of the United States at the time its claim arose would
be able to bring a claim under Title III. International law generally
requires that, absent an international agreement to the contrary,
claimants who were Cuban citizens at the time of the confiscation
must seek their remedies in Cuban courts. By permitting former
Cuban citizens to fie claims, the Act significantly broadens the
class of eligible claimants beyond the bounds of what international
law allows.

141.

Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

1059 (2d ed. 1987).
142. 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (a)(3).
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In addition, according to a ruling by the International Court of
Justice, it appears that U.S. shareholders of an expropriated
corporation which had been incorporated in Cuba may not have
standing to sue under Title 111.143 The I.C.J. held in Barcelona
Traction that the country of incorporation, and not the country of
the shareholders' residence, has the right of diplomatic protection
on behalf of a corporation which was expropriated without
compensation.1" The Barcelona Traction case dealt with three
countries: the country where the expropriation of corporate assets
occurred (Spain), the country of corporate registration (Canada),
and the country of shareholder residence (Belgium). The I.C.J.
held that Canada, and not Belgium, had the right of diplomatic
protection, which it chose not to exercise.' 45 The Belgian shareholders could only seek redress in Spanish courts and not by
invoking the Belgian government's protection through international
legal proceedings.'4 6 The court noted in dicta that it declined to
answer whether Belgium would have had standing if Barcelona
Traction had been a Spanish corporation, but it indicated that a
theory of international law has developed whereby the State of the
shareholders may have the right of diplomatic protection if the
"state whose responsibility is invoked is the national State of the
47
company."1
C. Secondary Boycotts
Opponents of Helms-Burton argue that it is a secondary
boycott and therefore is in violation of both U.S. and international
law. The prohibition against secondary boycotts has been a
principle of American Law since 1977.148 Under the Export
Administration Act, is unlawful for any 'United States person' to
comply with or further, in the interstate or foreign commerce of the
United States, 'any boycott fostered or imposed by a foreign
country against a country which is friendly to the United States" 49
"In a secondary boycott, state A (e.g., the United States) mandates
that if X, a national of state C (e.g., Canada), trades with state B

143. See Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co., Ltd.
(Belgium v. Spain) Second Phase, 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 8 (1997).
149. Id.
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(e.g., Cuba), then X cannot trade with state A. Essentially, state
A is forcing X to choose between doing business with state A and
state B, even though the law of state C, of which X is a citizen,
permits X to trade with state B. The boycott of Israel by the
League of Arab States is the best-known example of a secondary
boycott. The United States has an anti-boycott law which prohibits
U.S. companies from complying with the Arab boycott of Isra150
el.
The provisions of the Act imposing private liability for
trafficking in confiscated property amount to a secondary boycott
of persons who deal with Cuba. Although the international law of
secondary boycotts is somewhat indeterminate, it is the declared
policy of the United States to oppose such boycotts. Moreover,
secondary boycotts generally are considered inconsistent with
international law because they fall into the category of "nonforcible countermeasures," which may be taken only in proportion
to a breach of some obligation or duty owed to the invoking
state.'
Liability under Helms-Burton is not based on the breach
of any obligation or duty to the United States, but only on the act
of trafficking in confiscated property.
On the other hand, proponents of Helms-Burton argue that the
Act is not a secondary boycott because third-country nationals are
permitted to trade and invest with Cuba so long as the Cuban
property in which they are investing or benefitting was not
expropriated without compensation. The Act imposes sanctions
against those who do business with, or derive economic benefits
from, expropriated property; it does not penalize a person simply
for trading with Cuba. For example, if a French company purchases an interest in a Cuban joint venture which builds a hotel at a
Cuban beach resort, the company avoids liability under the Act so
long as the property on which the hotel was built, or the material
used to build the hotel, was not confiscated.
This argument fails to point out that virtually all commercial
enterprises in Cuba were expropriated by the Government in the
years after Fidel Castro came to power, whether they belonged to
15 2
U.S. nationals, Cuban nationals, or third-country nationals.

150. Amendments to the Export Administration Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52,
91 Stat. 234 (June 22, 1977), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2407, and 15 C.F.R. pt. 369,
presently 15 C.F.R. pt. 769.
151. M.N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 695-97 (3d. Ed.1991).
152. Kern Alexander & Jon Mills, Resolving Property Claims in a Post-Socialist
Cuba, 27 Law & Pol. Intl' Bus. 137, 143-45 (1995).
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Therefore, any person who deals with an enterprise which existed
prior to January 1, 1959, or with an enterprise which could be
regarded as a successor to such an enterprise, is exposed to liability
under the Act, if it does business involving confiscated property to
which a U.S. national may have a claim. Thus, the Act effectively
constitutes a secondary boycott against Cuba that, like the actions
of the Arab League in imposing sanctions against Israel, seeks to
coerce conduct that takes place wholly outside of the nation
attempting to impose its jurisdiction. Moreover, because Congress
has denounced secondary boycotts by enacting anti-secondary
boycott legislation, it seems illogical for it to enact a law which
effectively creates a secondary boycott by imposing sanctions
against third-country nationals for trading or doing business with
expropriated property in Cuba.
D.

Extra-TerritorialJurisdiction

The Act's greatest encroachment on existing international law
may exist in the area of "jurisdiction to prescribe." The concept of
jurisdiction to prescribe defines the extent to which a nation may
extend its laws extra-territorially.153 Title III provides a cause of
action in a U.S. court against any non-U.S. person or company that
has met the requisite definition of trafficking in expropriated
Cuban property."' If the non-U.S. person is found within U.S.
territory, the claimant can obtain in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant based on acts committed by the defendant outside of
U.S. territory but which affected the Cuban property rights of the
claimant. The provision also allows a claimant to obtain subject
matter jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who has never been
present in the United States but who has benefitted from the use
of expropriated property. According to this approach, a claimant
may obtain a provisional remedy against a defendant by seizing or
attaching any property of the defendant located within the United
States, even though the defendant may never have been physically
present in the United States. "'
This raises the obvious issue of whether customary international law permits U.S. courts to enforce its laws against defendants
which have committed acts outside of U.S. territory and which have

LOWENFELD, supra note 120, at 46.
154. Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 815 § 302 (a)(6) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082
(a)(1)(A)(i),(ii) & (iii)).
155. This approach is similar to obtaining in rem jurisdiction over the property
of a foreign defendant located within U.S. territory.
153.

1998]

CONFISCATED CUBAN PROPERTY

little or no effect within the United States. Section 301(9) of Title
III states: "International law recognizes that a nation has the ability
to provide for rules of law with respect to conduct outside its
territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its

territory. ' The language of section 301(9) is identical to that
of section 402(1)(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law.'57 However, the drafters of section 301(9) failed

to include the immediately subsequent section (403), which qualifies
the meaning in section 402(1)(c). Section 403 of the Restatement
provides a limitation on 402's general jurisdiction to prescribe.
section 403(1) provides: "Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable.' 158 It appears that Congress took the message of
the Restatement somewhat out of context in an attempt to bolster
the legal validity of Title III. Analysed within the context of the
entire Restatement, though, it becomes more difficult to justify the
extraterritorial extension of U.S. law to reach out to those
defendants who did. not act in a manner that had any effect,
intended or actual, in the United States. Any effect within the
United States of property expropriated in Cuba in 1959-if any
effect can be identified at all-was caused by the Castro government, not by persons over whom jurisdiction is sought to be
exercised under Helms-Burton. Moreover, even if an "effect"
could be identified, section 403(1) directs that the exercise of
jurisdiction must still not be "unreasonable." It does not appear
reasonable for the U.S. government to dictate the investment
policies of foreign companies deciding whether to invest in a
separate foreign country.
Finally, it is questionable whether a U.S. court could gain
personal jurisdiction over every defendant in a Title III civil
action.'59

156. Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. 814 § 301(9) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6081(9)).
Restatement of the Law (Third), Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Vol.
1, Section 401 & 402 (1987) [hereinafter Restatement Third].
157. Id. at Section 402.
158. Id. at Section 403(1).
159. Even Mr. Brice Clagett, a Washington D.C. attorney, author and supporter
of Helms-Burton, conceded that it will be very difficult to establish personal
jurisdiction in the United States for many cases filed against foreign nationals who
have no connection with the United States, or whose property in the United States
is completely unrelated to the claims for expropriated property. Proceedingsfrom
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Title III permits a U.S. national who owns a claim to confiscated property in Cuba to money damages from any foreign individual
or company which traffics in their former property. Presumably,
some of these defendants have no relationship to or contacts with
any federal district of the United States and, therefore, would not
be amenable to suit in U.S. court. In addition, those foreign
individuals and companies that do have contacts in the United
States may not be amenable to suit in U.S. courts under current
theories of personal jurisdiction if their contacts in the United
States are entirely unrelated to the activity in Cuba that gave rise
to the cause of action under Title III of the Act. Therefore, it is
doubtful that U.S. courts would have proper personal jurisdiction
over all defendants even if Helms-Burton provides the necessary
subject matter jurisdiction.
V.

Conclusion

The lender liability provision of the Helms-Burton law imposes
substantial risk of liability and criminal prosecution to any U.S. or
U.S.-controlled lending institution that makes a loan or provides a
credit to a person doing business with confiscated property in Cuba.
U.S. lending institutions, foreign banks, finance companies or aliens
which have some type of business presence in the United States
may be held liable for civil damages under Title III of the Act if
they finance transactions involving confiscated property in Cuba.
The severe penalties under the CACRs against persons within the
jurisdiction of U.S. law and the possible private right of action
against U.S. lending institutions for indirectly financing international transactions which benefit from use of confiscated Cuban
property necessitate a thorough review of transnational loan
portfolios inquiring as to what degree of exposure, if any, U.S.
persons and entities have under the Act. Moreover, although the
private right of action which is available under Title III will likely
remain suspended for the duration of the Clinton administration,
a new president may lift the waiver and allow the lawsuits to
proceed. Consequently, international banks and other non-U.S.
investors in Cuban property should be aware of the civil damages
to which they are exposed in U.S. courts as a result of investing in
confiscated Cuban property. Similarly, U.S.-controlled foreign
banks and other entities who invest and finance transactions

the Centre for InternationalPolicy (CIP), Ottawa, Canada, held on May 16-17,
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involving Cuba may be subject to severe criminal and civil fines by
the U.S. government. Although it appears that the extra-territorial
provisions of Helms-Burton and the CACRs violate customary
international law, these provisions remain in effect and will likely
be upheld by U.S. courts. However, foreign nationals which are
subject to the jurisdiction of these laws may have a better chance
at invalidating these provision if they persuade their home
governments to assert claims before international trade organizations such as the World Trade Organization.

